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Abstract
Toward Establishing a Catalog of Security Architecture Weaknesses
Joanna Cecilia da Silva Santos
Supervising Professor: Dr. Mehdi Mirakhorli
The architecture design of a software system plays a crucial role in addressing security re-
quirements early in the development lifecycle through forming design solutions that prevent
or mitigate attacks in a system. Consequently, flaws in the software architecture can impact
various security concerns in the system, thereby introducing severe breaches that could be
exploited by attackers. In this context, this thesis presents the new concept of Common
Architectural Weakness Enumeration (CAWE), a catalog that identifies and categorizes
common types of vulnerabilities rooted in the software architecture design and provides
mitigation techniques to address each of them. Through this catalog, we aim to promote
the awareness of architectural flaws and stimulate security design thinking to developers,
architects and software engineers. This work also investigates the reported vulnerabilities
from four real and complex software systems to verify the existence and implications of
architecture weaknesses. From this investigation, we noted that a variety of breaches are
indeed rooted in the software design (at least 35% in the investigated systems), providing
evidence that architectural weaknesses frequently occurs in complex systems, resulting in
medium to high severe vulnerabilities. Therefore, a catalog of such type of weaknesses can
be useful for adopting proactive approaches to avoid design vulnerabilities.
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Software security, which is concerned about engineering a software that remains work-
ing under malicious attacks, is a relatively new field [27] and has been pointed as an af-
terthought: firstly, the software is released, then the security problems that are found during
its usage are fixed. This fact can be observed when reading the release notes of a software
product, which usually indicate some patches to fix vulnerabilities. The problem with this
reactive approach is that there could be potential consequences with the exploitation of the
discovered breaches (such as brand reputation damage and money losses [36]).
The architecture of a software exhibits the set of design decisions made by the archi-
tect to satisfy quality requirements, such as availability, performance, security and so forth.
Thus, software architecture design is the first and the fundamental step to address secu-
rity concerns early in the software development lifecycle. To satisfy a security concern,
an architect must consider alternate design solutions, evaluate their trade-offs, identify the
risks and select the best option [4]. These design decisions are often based on well-known
security patterns [3, 4, 20, 21], which provide reusable solutions for enforcing the required
authentication, authorization, confidentiality, data integrity, privacy, accountability, avail-
ability, safety and non-repudiation requirements, even when the system is under attack.
Previous estimations [27] indicate that roughly 50% of security problems are the result
of software design flaws, such as miss-understanding architecturally significant require-
ments, poor architectural implementation, violation of design principles in the source code
and degradation of the security architecture. Since the software security architecture is one
of the main factors to achieve security goals within a software, flaws in the architecture
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can have a greater impact on the security aspect of a software than purely coding bugs [1].
Design flaws in the architecture of a software system mean that successful attacks could
lead to enormous consequences.
Design flaws (or only “flaws”) are different from Bugs, as the latter are more code-level
(such as buffer overflows caused by miscalculations) while the former are at a higher-level
of abstraction, require a deeper analysis on the software’s design and are much more subtle
than bugs [1]. Although a software system will always have bugs, recent studies show
that the security of many software applications is breached due to flaws in the architecture
[1, 32].
Architectural flaws are results of inappropriate design choices in early stages of soft-
ware development, incorrect implementation of security patterns, or degradation of security
architecture over time [29, 40]. An example of an architectural flaw is the “Use of Client-
Side Authentication” [10], in which a client/server product performs authentication within
the client code, but not in the server code. This design decision allows the authentication
feature to be bypassed via a modified client that omits the authentication check. It cre-
ates a flaw in the security architecture that can be successfully exploited by an intruder
with reverse-engineering skills. Another instance of an architectural flaw is the “Cleartext
Transmission of Sensitive Information”, in which a sensitive information (e.g.credit card
number) is exchanged without encryption [15]. In this flaw, an attacker could steal this
information by capturing the messages being transmitted in the network.
Even though there are many techniques and practices that help to develop a secure
software system (such as threat modeling [39], penetration testing [2], static and dynamic
code analysis [6, 35], etc.), there have not been many previous works in the literature that
approach security from an architectural perspective. A recent effort is the IEEE Center for
Secure Design launched by the IEEE Computer Society. However, as of today, there are
not many examples of design flaws obtained or published yet that can help architects and
developers to learn and avoid such flaws.
3
1.1 Objectives
As discussed in the introduction, there is still a need for tackling this problem in terms of
design flaws [32]. Hence, the primary goal of this work is to approach security according to
an architectural point of view through the new concept of Common Architectural Weakness
Enumeration (CAWE): a catalog of architectural weaknesses (i.e. security issues rooted
in the software security architecture). The overall idea is to provide an artifact to help
developers and architects in understanding the consequences of having such breaches in
their software and identify possible ways to avoid them to occur. This catalog was built on
top of a previous library of Common Software Weaknesses Enumeration (CWE) 1, which
is a community-developed enumeration of common types of vulnerabilities (weaknesses)
maintained by the MITRE Corporation. This library, however, does not categorize weak-
nesses based on their architectural impacts and does not clearly distinguish architecture-
related issues from purely programming issues.
The second objective is to report the results of an analysis of the vulnerabilities from
four large complex systems (namely Linux Kernel, Chrome, Thunderbird, and PHP) and
to demonstrate instances of architectural weaknesses within these systems. Besides that,
this work discusses the practical aspects of CAWE catalog, indicating how it can be used
in activities within the software development lifecycle and how it can be integrated into the
existing MITRE’s library.
1.2 Research Questions
This work addresses the following research questions:
• RQ1: What security weaknesses are rooted in the software architecture?
The answer to this question proposes to identify, among the documented types of
security weaknesses from the MITRE’s library, which ones can happen due to a
1http://cwe.mitre.org/
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design flaw or an architectural drift.
• RQ2: What security patterns are more likely to have associated vulnerabilities?
By knowing the answer of R1, we aim to classify each security weakness per security
pattern. This way, we can spot the security patterns that are more likely to introduce
vulnerabilities when improperly applied and in which ways these vulnerabilities may
occur.
• RQ3: What are the most common design issues in real software systems?
In this research question, we aim to verify the proportion of vulnerabilities in exist-
ing systems are rooted in their architecture, identifying what are the most common
architectural flaws in software systems.
1.3 Thesis Organization
This work is organized as follows: Chapter 2 explores the concepts of security patterns
and architectural flaws. Chapter 3 presents the CAWE catalog, its structure, and creation
process. Chapter 4 presents the answers to all the three research questions and provides
some real examples of architectural weaknesses. Chapter 5 discusses ways to use the cat-
alog within an IT organization and to integrate the CAWE catalog to the MITRE’s library.
Chapter 6 presents the related works. Chapter 7 explains the threats to the validity of this




Security principles need to be implemented from the ground up to ensure an application
is secure. During requirements analysis, malicious practices are taken for granted, and
requirements engineers identify all the use cases which are interests of an attacker. During
architecture design, architects carefully analyze these requirements and adopts appropriate
security patterns to resist, detect and/or recover from attacks [34].
2.1 Security Patterns
Security patterns are the building blocks of a security architecture. A combination of pat-
terns are required to be implemented to deliver a secure system in which the legitimate users
are properly authenticated; access controls are applied to enforce that only authorized users
can access their designated functionality; user activities are audited, so recovering from a
malicious activity is feasible; information integrity is preserved and similar security char-
acteristics are addressed.
Several researchers and practitioners have worked on collecting and organizing security
patterns [34]. For instance, Hafiz et al.. [20] discussed an organization of a subset of pat-
terns according to different classification schemes (e.g. based on the application context and
the STRIDE [22] models) and later showed a pattern language to indicate the relationship
among those patterns [21]. Likewise, Kienzle et al. [25] presented a repository of security
patterns. Besides research papers, many textbooks described in details security patterns
either specific to a software technology (e.g. J2EE) [38] or to general use, regardless of
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software domain and underlying technical choices [34].
While these security patterns provide a well-formed solution to address various security
concerns, if these patterns are not adopted and implemented carefully, they can result in
severe breaches in a security architecture. In the subsequent section, we discuss several
ways that a security architecture can be flawed or degraded.
2.2 Flaws in a Security Architecture
The IEEE Center for Secure Design has been focusing on identifying the most relevant
design flaws based on experiences in the industry, academia, and government. Currently, it
identified top ten design flaws that are caused either by a weak design (i.e. an incomplete
architecture whose security mechanisms can be bypassed by attackers) or due to lack of
design decisions (e.g. not having an authorization enforcement in the system) [1]. Even if
the architecture fulfills all security requirements appropriately, previous studies have shown
that the architecture can erode as the software evolves or may be wrongly implemented in
the code [24, 29, 40]. Consequently, based on these observations, we can classify architec-
tural flaws to Omission, Commission and Realization Flaws:
• Omission Flaws are caused by decisions that were never made (e.g. ignoring a
security requirement or potential threats). A common omission design flaw is to store
a password in a file without encryption [8]. In this flaw, the architect overlooks the
need of protecting sensitive data from unauthorized users and assumes that attackers
would never have access to the file, thereby considering that the password stored in
plaintext would not correspond to a compromise of the system. However, this lack
of encryption can open the system to attacks, because anyone, who has granted read
access to the file, will be able to read all the stored passwords. Similarly, the flaw of
having cleartext transmission of sensitive information [15] also can result in a steal
of sensitive information by attackers that can capture the data being exchanged in the
communication channel.
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• Commission Flaws refer to the design decisions which were made and could lead to
undesirable consequences. An example of such type of flaw is “Client side authen-
tication” [10], mentioned earlier in the introduction. While architects have made a
design decision, the flaw in this design will enable attackers to bypass the authenti-
cation through implementing a modified client that does not have the authentication
check. Another example of such flaw is “Using a Weak Cryptography for Passwords”
to achieve better performance while maintaining data confidentiality. In this flaw, the
passwords are stored with an obfuscation mechanism that is computationally less
complex but easier for attackers to guess [13]. Consequently, such improper design
choice makes it possible that attackers to recover the passwords via an exhaustive
search.
• Realization Flaws are the design decisions that are correct (i.e. satisfies the soft-
ware’s security requirements), but its implementation suffers from a coding mistake.
For example, a developer fails to perform authenticity check in the critical parts of
the system [14]. In another instance, the developers incorrectly sanitize special ele-
ments in user-provided inputs, which can lead to many consequences, such as crashes
(denial of service) or bypass of protection mechanisms [12].
In the Chapter that follows, we present the CAWE catalog which documents such types
of flaws in a systematic way.
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Chapter 3
Catalog of Architectural Weaknesses
The MITRE Corporation, with the support of the National Cyber Security Division at US
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), maintains a collection of common software
weaknesses (http://cwe.mitre.org/). This collection contains over 1,000 software weak-
nesses, but these vulnerabilities are not categorized based on their architectural impacts
and implications. Thus, we classified those weaknesses architecture-related vulnerabili-
ties. As a result, we have developed the Common Architectural Weakness Enumeration
(CAWE), a catalog that enumerates common architectural flaws in a software system that
can lead to a security vulnerability.
The next sections of this Chapter detail the systematic process followed to create the
catalog and how the data within is structured.
3.1 Creating the Catalog
As briefly mentioned before, the CAWE catalog was built on top of the MITRE’s compila-
tion of software weaknesses (CWE collection). Figure 3.1 shows a structural overview of
the CWE collection, in which we only showed some of the elements for the sake simplic-
ity 1. As noted in this figure, each entry in the CWE collection can be of four types: View
(for grouping weaknesses in a given perspective), Category (used to categorize weaknesses
based on a common attribute), Weakness (an actual security issue) and Compound Element
1The complete structure of the CWE collection can be found at MITRE’s Website:
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/xsd/cwe schema v5.4.2.xsd
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(a security issue due to the occurrence of other weaknesses in a time sequence). For each
Weakness and Compound Elements types, the collection provides information about the
issue, such as its description, mitigation techniques, code examples, and so forth.
Figure 3.1: Partial Structure of MITRE‘s CWE Collection with its Upper Elements.
Since the CWE collection is available as an XML (eXtensible Markup Language) doc-
ument in the MITRE’s Web site 2, we retrieved a list of all entries that are of type Weakness
or Compound Elements. The other element types (Categories and Views) were not included
as they serve more as a grouping of weaknesses rather than providing details about a spe-
cific type of vulnerability. Then, we analyzed each collected entry to classify whether it is
rooted in the security architecture. Once we considered that an entry has an architectural
implication, we further investigated it to verify (i) which security pattern(s) can be related
to the weakness and (ii) and how the related pattern(s) may be impacted.
To increase the accuracy of this mapping, a second graduate student in Software En-
gineering, who was familiar with security patterns and software architecture design, peer
reviewed the catalog. Thus, this individual inspected the entries from the MITRE’s col-
lection and performed the same steps described before (classification of the entries into
architectural/non-architectural and identification of the related security patterns), sharing
the rationale behind each mapping. After this peer review process, we established the




To accommodate all the gathered information and to provide a rich knowledge base about
architectural weaknesses, we structured the CAWE catalog as shown in Figure 3.2. In this
figure, we note that the catalog organizes the design flaws based on the security patterns
that are impacted by them. This way, the CAWE catalog encompasses a list of Impacted
Pattern elements, which are used to provide the details about each security pattern (its
context, problem, solution, and so forth) and the relationships between the pattern and one
or more design flaws.
Figure 3.2: Structure of the CAWE catalog .
As discussed in Chapter 2,a missing design choice, an incorrect implementation of an
architectural choice or an improper design decision can cause flaws in the software. There-
fore, each Design Flaw element contains an impact type attribute, which indicates
whether the flaw is an omission, commission or a realization flaw, and an explanation
attribute, that describes how the associated security pattern is impacted. Every Design
Flaw element also points to one entry from the CWE collection. Such link is used to
provide detailed information about the architectural weakness.
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3.3 Catalog Overview
The CAWE catalog is publicly available online at http://design.se.rit.edu/
cawe. It currently contains 384 flaws that were categorized based on their impacts over
39 security patterns. Table 3.1 shows an entry from the CAWE catalog, which presents
a weakness due to an incorrect implementation (Realization Flaw) of the Secure Session
Management pattern [34] (some text in this Table was hidden for the sake of clarity). From
this table, we observe that each CAWE instance refers to an entry from the MITRE’s li-
brary of software weaknesses. This reference contains the detailed information about the
design flaw, such as a textual description, source code examples, mitigation techniques and
detection methods of the weakness. Moreover, a CWE entry can indicate how this flaw
can be exploited by an intruder through pointing to external entries from the Common At-
tack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) [11], which is a dictionary of known
attack patterns.
Through this catalog architects and developers can learn to avoid common architectural
issues in the software. Since the catalog is organized around security patterns, architects
and developers can easily identify potential flaws related to a particular security pattern.
For instance, a common design decision is to use encryption algorithms from libraries to
store/exchange data [32]. However, developers and architects may overlook the properties
of these encryption algorithms, making incorrect assumptions about their usage. Since
understanding the algorithm is crucial to properly secure data, our catalog enumerates a set
weaknesses that can guide them to obtain such knowledge. Examples of such weaknesses
are: “CAWE-328 Reversible One-Way Hash“ and “CAWE-780 Use of RSA Algorithm
without Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding”.
12

























Explanation This incorrect implementation of the session management can lead to information disclosure. (...)
CWE
Entry
Title: Exposure of Data Element to Wrong Session
Description: The product does not sufficiently enforce boundaries between the states of different
sessions, causing data to be provided to, or used by, the wrong session. (...)
Demonstrative Example: The following Servlet stores the value of a request parameter in a member
field and then later echoes the parameter value to the response output stream. While this code will
work perfectly in a single-user environment, if two users access the Servlet at approximately the
same time, it is possible for the two request handler threads to interleave in the following way:
Thread 1: assign “Dick” to name Thread 2: assign “Jane” to name Thread 1: print “Jane, thanks
for visiting!” Thread 2: print “Jane, thanks for visiting!”. Thereby, showing the first user the
second user’s name.
public class GuestBook extends HttpServlet {
String name;








• Architecture and Design Phase: Protect the application’s sessions from information leakage.
Make sure that a session’s data is not used or visible by other sessions.
• Testing Phase: Use a static analysis tool to scan the code for information leakage vulnerabilities
(e.g. Singleton Member Field).
Attack Patterns:
• CAPEC-59 Session Credential Falsification through Prediction





4.1 RQ1: Architectural Weaknesses
RQ1: What security weaknesses are rooted in the software architecture?
Once we consolidated the CAWE catalog, we observed that, among the 727 entries of type
Weaknesses or Compound Elements from the CWE library, there were 384 of them with
architectural implications. A full list of these security architectural weaknesses is provided
in our Web site (http://design.se.rit.edu/cawe).
4.2 RQ2: Most Impacted Security Patterns
RQ2: What security patterns are more likely to have associated vulnerabilities?
Table 4.1 reports the total number of design weaknesses identified for each security pattern,
based on the CAWE catalog. In this table, we observe that, in the case of “Chroot Jail”
pattern, we found 70 common flaws that can impact the robustness of this security pattern.
For most patterns, this number is smaller, except for “Intercepting Validator” which has 166
flaws related to its implementation. The reason for such a large number is that there are a
large number of known security weaknesses which can result in breaches in the system due
to issues in the input data [32].
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Table 4.1: Total Number of Identified Design Flaws for Each Security Pattern.
Pattern Name # Pattern Name # Pattern Name #
Administrator Objects 25 Exception Shielding 31 Policy Delegate 7
Assertion Builder 6 Firewall 1 Policy Enforcement Point 34
Audit Trails 8 Hidden Metadata 3 Protected System 16
Authenticator 41 HMAC 12 Protection Reverse Proxy 2
Authorization 54 Information Obscurity 5 Role based access control 18
Batched Routing 3 Intercepting Web Agent 39 Secure Base Action 3
Brokered Authentication 29 Intercepting Validator 166 Secure Communication 15
Chroot Jail 70 Message Inspector 13 Secure Message Router 5
Control Process Creator 12 Message Interceptor Gateway 16 Security Provider 36
Credential 17 Minefield 2 Security Proxy 3
Demilitarized Zone 1 Morphed Representation 7 Session Management 8
Encrypted Storage 33 Obfuscated Transfer Object 19 Single Sign On 5
Error Detection and Correction 6 Password Synchronizer 20 Subject Descriptor 7
4.3 RQ3: The Most Common Design Issues
RQ3: What are the most common design issues in real software systems?
To respond to this third research question, we investigated the reported vulnerabilities from
four real and complex systems. The software systems chosen as case studies were: the
Linux Kernel (contains the core functions of the Linux Operating System), the Google
Chrome (a Web browser), the Mozilla Thunderbird (an application for managing email
and news feeds) and PHP (the interpreter of the PHP language). These four systems were
selected because they are among the open source projects with a higher number of known
vulnerabilities and from distinct domains, which can enrich this discussion of architectural
flaws.
4.3.1 Vulnerabilities Dataset
To conduct such analysis, two types of information are required: the security breaches
in each case study and their respective root causes. To do so, we queried the National
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Vulnerability Database (NVD) 1 to obtain all the reported vulnerabilities for each case
study. As a response, the NVD provides the vulnerabilities of a project as a list of CVE
(Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) instances [7]. In short, these CVE instances
identify the severity of the vulnerability, the date it was reported, a description and links to
external resources with more details about the breach (such as URLs to threads discussion
about the issue, bug tracking systems, etc.). Each CVE instance sometimes also indicate
its root cause through a tag that points to a documented software weakness from MITRE’s
collection (CWE entry). Thus, in the presence of this link, we verify whether the problem is
an architectural flaw or a purely coding bug through comparing the referred CWE instance
against our CAWE catalog. For the CVEs without any further information about its causes
(i.e. without a tag), we manually inspected them to obtain such information.
4.3.2 Results
Table 4.2 shows the size of these projects (in terms of the number of files in the latest ver-
sion) and the amount of vulnerabilities collected for each project. This table also presents
the total number of CVEs that have an explicit CWE tag and the amount of CVEs that
we manually tagged. It is important to highlight that there were vulnerabilities that were
deprecated (i.e. invalid) or external to the architecture of the case studies (such as vulner-
abilities in applications that execute in a Linux environment but not in the Linux Kernel
itself). Therefore, we discarded these vulnerabilities from our dataset, so Table 4.2 reports
only the instances that are under the scope of our analysis.
Table 4.2: Overview of the Vulnerability Dataset
Project # Files #CVEs #With Tags #No Tags #Arch. CVEs #Non-arch. CVEs
Chrome 46,544 1251 1067 184 441 810
Thunderbird 19617 704 517 187 310 394
PHP 2028 425 267 158 214 211
Linux Kernel 39787 1342 918 424 540 802
1https://cve.mitre.org
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In this table, we observe that approximately 50% of the reported vulnerabilities for PHP
had an impact on its security architecture, being the project with the highest percentage of
architectural issues. In the other systems, this percentage of architectural vulnerabilities
was 35% for Chrome, 44% for Thunderbird and 40% for Linux Kernel.
Table 4.3 shows the most common security issues in those cases studies as well as
the severity level of these problems (Low, Medium, High or Critical), as provided by the
NVD based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) version 2 [28]. From
this table, we note that most of the architectural issues in those case studies is a problem
in failing to implement the Intercepting Validator pattern properly (CAWE-20, CAWE-79,
CAWE-94, CAWE-134, CAWE-138 and CAWE-158). Failing to validate consistently the
user-provided data can lead to a variety of consequences, such as crashes (denial of service)
and leakage of sensitive information. We also observe that issues related to enforcing
access control (CAWE-200, CAWE-274, CAWE-280, CAWE-284, and CAWE-782) are
also common among those systems. These weaknesses are mostly caused by an incorrect
implementation of patterns related to permission management such as “Authorization”,
“Role-based access control” and “Policy Enforcement Point”. Lastly, we observe that the
architectural flaws expose these systems to consequences that are at least at a “Medium”
severity level.
One of the reasons that resulted in such high number of input validation issues is due to
the fact that some architectural flaws can only occur in certain contexts. For example, the
Client Side Authentication Flaw only occurs in software with the client-server architecture.
However, regardless of the software domain, a software will be provided which may be
valid or malformed (intentionally by attackers or unconsciously by misuses from legitimate
users) thereby, input validation issues can happen in any software system.
The next section discusses examples from these case studies of architectural weak-
nesses.
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Table 4.3: The Most Common Architectural Weaknesses in the Case Studies.





CAWE-20 Improper Input Validation 170 High
CAWE-284 Improper Access Control 51 Medium
CAWE-200 Information Exposure 36 Medium
CAWE-274 Improper Handling of Insufficient Privileges 34 Medium
CAWE-79 Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation 26 Medium
PH
P
CAWE-20 Improper Input Validation 79 Medium
CAWE-280 Improper Handling of Insufficient Permissions or Privileges 36 Medium
CAWE-158 Improper Neutralization of Null Byte or NUL Character 13 Medium
CAWE-134 Use of Externally-Controlled Format String 10 High







CAWE-20 Improper Input Validation 71 Medium
CAWE-284 Improper Access Control 54 Medium
CAWE-94 Improper Control of Generation of Code (’Code Injection’) 34 High
CAWE-79 Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation 34 Medium




CAWE-20 Improper Input Validation 230 Medium
CAWE-274 Improper Handling of Insufficient Privileges 40 Medium
CAWE-284 Improper Access Control 38 Medium
CAWE-391 Unchecked Error Condition 9 Medium
CAWE-782 Exposed IOCTL with Insufficient Access Control 6 Medium
4.4 Examples of Architectural Weaknesses
The Secure Session Management pattern is concerned about managing sessions, which are
a set of activities performed over a limited period by a specified user. The primary goal of
this pattern is to keep track of who is using the system at a given time through managing a
session object that contains all relevant data associated with the user and the session [34]. In
this pattern, every user is assigned an exclusive identifier (Session ID), which is utilized for
both identifying users and retrieving the user-related data. Since session IDs are a sensitive
information, this pattern may be affected by two main types of attacks: session hijacking
(an attacker impersonate a legitimate user through stealing or predicting a valid session ID)
and session fixation (an attacker has a valid session ID and forces the victim to use this ID).
The session hijacking can be facilitated by the architectural flaw of not securing the




Description: PHP 4.0 through 4.1.1 stores session IDs in temporary files whose name contains the session ID, which allows local
users to hijack web connections.
Main Impacted File: ext/session/mod file.cc





CAWE-311: Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data
CAWE-538: File and Directory Information Exposure
Per this description we note that PHP was designed to store each session data in files
in a temporary directory without using a security mechanism for storing these session files
(such as encryption). When closely inspecting the source code of PHP in version 4.0, we
observe that the mod file.cc names every session file as “sess xyz” (where “xyz” is the
session ID), as shown in the code snippet presented above (where buf is a variable later
used when creating the session files).
Figure 4.1 shows a scenario in which the flaw could be exploited. First, a legitimate user
successfully identifies him/herself to the application. This causes the Web application, writ-
ten in PHP, to start a session for the user through invoking the session start() from
the PHP’s session module. Then, the session module in the PHP assigns a session ID
for the user, and it creates a new file named as “sess qEr1bqv1q4V2FGX9C7mvb0” to store
the data about the user’s session. At this point, the security of the application is compro-
mised when an attacker observes the session file name and realizes that the user’s session ID
is equals to “qEr1bqv1q4V2FGX9C7mvb0”. Subsequently, the attacker can impersonate
the user through sending a cookie (PHPSESSIONID) in a HTTP request with this stolen
Session ID. The Web application, after calling functions from the PHP’s session, veri-
fies that the session ID provided matches with the user’s data so, the application considers
that a legitimate user is making the request.
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Figure 4.1: Session Hijacking in PHP.
From this scenario, we note that such architectural weakness can lead to many conse-
quences. First, if the user has an administrative role in the application, the attacker will be
able to perform all the administrative tasks. Second, the attacker may be able to read the
contents of the session file, thereby accessing the data about the user, which may be sen-
sitive. It is important to highlight that such flaw affects not only the Secure Session Man-
agement but also other security patterns (e.g. Authentication and Authorization) which use
the Secure Session Management for performing authentication and access control of users.
The excerpt below shows an example from PHP of an architectural weakness that facil-
itates the session fixation:
CVE ID: CVE-2011-4718
Description: Session fixation vulnerability in the Sessions subsystem in PHP before 5.5.2 allows remote attackers to hijack web
sessions by specifying a session ID.
Main Impacted File: ext/session/mod files.c
69. static int ps_files_valid_key(const char *key)
70. {
(...)
76. for (p = key; (c = *p); p++) {
77. /* valid characters are a..z,A..Z,0..9 */
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78. if (!((c >= ’a’ && c <= ’z’)
79. || (c >= ’A’ && c <= ’Z’)
80. || (c >= ’0’ && c <= ’9’)
81. || c == ’,’
82. || c == ’-’)) {





88. len = p - key;
89.
90. /* Somewhat arbitrary length limit here, but should be way more than
91. anyone needs and avoids file-level warnings later on if we exceed MAX_PATH */
92. if (len == 0 || len > 128) {






146. static void ps_files_open(ps_files *data, const char *key TSRMLS_DC)
147. {
(...)
158. if (!ps_files_valid_key(key)) {
159. php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "The session id is too long or
contains illegal characters, valid characters are a-z, A-Z, 0-9 and ’-,’");







When verifying the session implementation in the source code of PHP version 5, we
note that there is an incorrect implementation (i.e. a realization flaw) in the PHP’s session
module that accepts uninitialized session IDs before using it for authentication/authorization
purposes. In fact, in the line 158 shown above, the function ps files valid key()
does not correctly validate the session ID. This function only checks whether it contains a
valid charset and has a correct length but does not verify whether the ID exists associated
to the client performing the HTTP request.
Figure 4.2 shows how this architectural vulnerability is exploited. The attack starts with
the attacker establishing a valid session ID (steps 1 to 4). Next, the attacker induces the
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user to authenticate him/herself in the system using the attacker’s session ID (steps 5 and
6).
Figure 4.2: Session Fixation Exploitation in PHP.
A common architectural flaw across all case studies is an improper implementation of
the validation mechanism for data before its usage in the software. A real example of this
design flaw can be observed in Thunderbird:
CVE ID: CVE-2009-2408
Description: Mozilla Network Security Services (NSS) before 3.12.3, Firefox before 3.0.13, Thunderbird before 2.0.0.23, and
SeaMonkey before 1.1.18 do not properly handle a ’
0’ character in a domain name in the subject’s Common Name (CN) field of an X.509 certificate, which allows man-in-the-middle
attackers to spoof arbitrary SSL servers via a crafted certificate issued by a legitimate Certification Authority. NOTE: this was
originally reported for Firefox before 3.5.
Main Impacted File: mozilla/security/nss/lib/certdb/certdb.c
1390. cert_VerifySubjectAltName(const CERTCertificate *cert, const char *hn)
1391. {
(...)
1446. int cnLen = current->name.other.len;
1447. if (cnLen + 1 > cnBufLen) {
1448. cnBufLen = cnLen + 1;




CAWE-20: Improper Input Validation
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In this flaw, the validation mechanism fails to validate a field of an X.509 certificate that
contains the NULL terminator (’\0’ character). As shown in the code snippet, at line 1446
the length of the CN field is calculated without a proper escaping the string variable. Given
that the ’\0’ is used to indicate the end of a string, the cnLen variable will have a smaller
value than the actual length of the CN field. This improper validation may allow attackers to
get a malicious certificate signed through placing the NULL terminator in the certificate’s
CN field. This way, users would be tricked to consider that the forged certificate is valid
then accepting it as trusted when it is not.
One example of a commission flaw was also observed in the PHP project. Initially, the
PHP was designed to have a configuration parameter (safe mode) for enforcing access
control of files and directories on the Web server. The security requirement behind this
parameter was to ensure that applications written in PHP and running on the same Web
server would not be able to access files from each other inadvertently [19]. Thus, once the
safe mode was enabled, whenever a PHP script tried to access (read/write) a file in the
server, the PHP would: (i) check whether the owner of the script’s source code file is the
same of the file being requested; (ii) then, grant access to those scripts that satisfies this
condition. However, such design is inappropriate to the context of PHP [19]. In this case
a better design would be that the enforcement was done in the executing environment (i.e.
the Operating System).
Moreover, such enforcement mechanism needed to be implemented throughout the
modules of PHP that performed any file-related operations. However, in some cases the
developers did not implement the check whether the safe modewas enabled and, then in-
voking the function that does the access control verification, thereby bypassing the designed
access control mechanism. Hence, applications that were relying on this safe mode
mechanism would have a breach. Therefore, PHP was later redesigned (version 5.4.0+) to
remove this safe mode configuration, outsourcing this access control at the Web server
and Operating System level.
Lastly, Chrome and Thunderbird had some vulnerabilities that were not only related to
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the security architecture but also touched upon usability concerns. These types of vulner-
abilities were caused by an incorrect implementation/design of a security concern which
introduced a breach that intruders can exploit through “user-assisted” attacks 2. For ex-
ample, the CVE-2005-2602 reports a problem in the input validation of a long URI in
Thunderbird resulting in a blank address bar, which facilitates phishing attacks.




Application of the CAWE Catalog
Since the CAWE catalog provides detailed information about architectural weaknesses, it
can be used to guide architects and developers make appropriate design and implementation
decisions to preserve security concerns throughout the software development lifecycle. For
example, code reviews, which is a common practice applied in many IT organizations
[18], are usually performed through a meeting focused on finding bugs through technical
discussions and analysis of the source code and other related artifacts (such as a portion
of the requirements document, the architecture, etc). Therefore, the reviewers, who are
responsible for inspecting the code, could use the CAWE catalog to check common security
issues that happen in the software domain under their review.
Past experiences in industry lead to the creation of security-driven software develop-
ment processes, which emphasizes security concerns early in the software development
lifecycle, such as CLASP (Comprehensive, Lightweight Application Security Process) [30]
and Microsoft’s SDL (Security Development Lifecycle) [23]. A common aspect of these
processes is the recommendation of providing proper training of the employees to develop
a common background in software security [41]. With this respect, our catalog could be
used to aid such training and promote the awareness of the potential architectural issues
that their systems may be exposed.
Moreover, those security-driven processes include two activities for modeling potential
threats in the software: threat modeling [39] and design of misuse cases [26]. Since these
two activities are usually done through brainstorming sessions, the CAWE could be used in
those sessions for obtaining insights. In fact, existing in experiences in the industry report
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the usage of threat libraries, built from a small subset of weaknesses from the MITRE’s
catalog, for aiding this threat modeling process [16].
In addition, architectural risk analysis, which is a systematic approach for evaluating
design decisions against quality requirements, could also benefit from our catalog. For ar-
chitectural risk analysis to be effective, the evaluators need to have a previous knowledge
of architectural flaws based on the software context (such as its requirements, architectural
patterns applied, etc.). Consequently, the CAWE catalog could be used as guidance when
performing such assessment. This guidance is twofold: on one hand, the enumerated flaws
of omission could be used as a roadmap for evaluators to identify missing relevant archi-
tectural decisions; on the other hand, the categorized flaws of commission and realization
allows to spot issues in the current architecture of the system, being the first step to assess
its impacts and risks.
5.1 Integration Into MITRE/DHS Collection of CWEs
To support the reuse of our findings and release the list of Common Architecture Weak-
nesses, we can integrate the CAWE catalog to the existing collection of software weak-
nesses (CWE) collected by the US Department of Homeland Security along with The
MITRE Corporation. This integration will be available online in MITRE’s collection.
The CWE library supports introducing new concepts without changes in its structure.
This is done through the Taxonomy Mapping element (presented in Figure 3.1), which
allows that every Weaknesses or Compound Elements to reference nodes in an external
taxonomy that have any sort of conceptual relation. Thus, we can use the Taxonomy
Mapping element to establish a connection between security patterns and software design
flaws, thereby augmenting the CWE collection with software architecture concepts.
For example, the CWE entry “Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value” [9] is re-
lated to the “Error Detection and Correction” pattern in the CAWE catalog. Hence, we can
connect this CWE entry to this pattern by using a new Taxonomy Mapping node with the
values presented in Figure 5.1. From this example we observe that the Mapped Node Name
26
attribute is used to indicate the impacted pattern, the Mapped Node ID refers to the iden-
tifier of a CAWE entry in the catalog and the Mapping Fit (which is hidden to simplify
the image) summarizes the impact of the weakness over the pattern. In this example, the
value of Mapping Fit explains that not applying the “Error Detection and Correction” when
transmitting data over an unreliable communication channel allows the software to use cor-
rupted data inadvertently.





Despite the research community efforts to create techniques and tools for developing more
secure software, there is a gap for procedures that address the security problem using an
architectural point of view [32]. Currently, there are many research and books focused on
the identification, categorization, and detailing of security patterns [20, 21, 25, 34, 38]. In
this work, however, we take one step further towards observing how these patterns could
be compromised when incorrectly implemented or inappropriately designed, thereby filling
the existing gap of overcoming security challenges from avoiding architectural flaws.
The usage of security knowledge bases to help developers and engineers in their daily
activities have been discussed in the research community. In this matter, security ontolo-
gies, which represents knowledge within the security domain, have been created to support
some activities (e.g. requirements engineering [37] and quantitative risk analysis [17]).
These ontologies, however, does not introduce architectural concepts on it [5].
In this context, similarly to a security ontology, Wu et al. [42] proposed the use of se-
mantic templates to keep track of the key details related to vulnerabilities. These templates
are a structured description of generic patterns of relationship between software compo-
nents, faults and security consequences built on top of the CWE collection and the CVE
dictionary. However, that work does not have a full complete list of templates for all the
CWE entries.
In addition to knowledge bases, some works are focused on methodological architecture-
related activities for engineering secure software. For example, Pedraza-Garcia et al. [31]
described activities, tools and notations to specify the security requirements of a software
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and guide the architect to select the architectural tactics that would better address the re-
quirements. The primary goal of that work was to minimize the impacts of design decisions
being informally done and dependent on the architect’s experience to select architectural
choices. Another example is described by Ryoo et al. [33], which proposes a vulnerability-
oriented architectural analysis approach that reuses the knowledge from known vulnerabil-
ities as a checklist when evaluating and designing an architecture. Unlike our work, these
efforts are focused on helping to engineer a secure software specifically in architectural
analysis activities, whereas the scope of our catalog is broader to other software develop-
ment activities.
In spite of these efforts of creating and sharing security-related knowledge and system-
atic approaches, to the best of our knowledge, there is no previous work that provided a




The threats to validity can be classified as construct, internal and external validity. Below
we explain the threats that may have impacted this work and the ways these threats were
mitigated.
External validity evaluates the generalizability of the approach and the extent to which
the results of a study can be generalized to other systems. A potential threat in this cat-
egory is that we analyzed our catalog against historical vulnerability reports from Linux
Kernel, PHP, Chrome and Thunderbird. However, we carefully selected these case studies
from different software domains. Therefore, we expect it to be representative of a typical
software engineering environment, which suggests that it could generalize to a broader set
of systems. Another threat to the external validity is that we focused our discussion on 39
security patterns. We tried to mitigate this threat through selecting security patterns that
satisfy different security concerns (such as privacy, authentication, non-repudiation, and so
on). Consequently, we believe that the results would not be overly different from other
security patterns.
Construct validity evaluates the degree to which the claims were correctly measured. With
this respect, one threat was the manual analysis of CVE instances in order to observe how
often and the nature of security design issues in real software systems. To mitigate this
threat we selected case studies with a higher number of reported vulnerabilities in order to
minimize the potential impacts of an incorrect analysis in our datasets. Furthermore, only a
small portion of the reported vulnerabilities does not have a CWE tag, so we only a smaller
subset of vulnerabilities needed to be manually inspected to define a CWE tag.
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Internal validity reflects the extent to which a study minimizes systematic error or bias
so that a causal conclusion can be drawn. The primary threat is related to the manual con-
struction of the CAWE catalog. To mitigate potential biases and incorrect classification of
weaknesses, a peer review process was conducted when establishing the CAWE collection.
In this review, a second graduate student also analyzed the entries from the MITRE’s col-
lection, mapped the appropriate ones to security patterns and shared the rationale of such
mapping, as previously explained in Chapter 3. Hence, we consider that such peer evalu-




Conclusion and Future Work
This thesis presented the new concept of CAWE (Common Architectural Weakness Enu-
meration), to stimulate security design thinking into developers daily coding activities
through a catalog that documents potential weaknesses related to security patterns. This
work aimed to fill in the gap of architectural knowledge of architecture-related security
issues.
In addition to creating the CAWE collection, this work reported the analysis of four
large case studies and observed that at least 35% of the investigated vulnerabilities are
rooted in the architecture of those case studies. Besides that, improper validation of inputs
and access control were the two most design flaws observed in real systems.
8.1 Future Work
The current state of the art of vulnerability detection tools is still focused on finding low-
level issues (bugs). This way, this catalog could be used as a knowledge base for automated
techniques to detect architectural-level vulnerabilities from source code. One potential way
to do this is through, firstly, detecting security patterns, then using the CAWE catalog to
reason about potential associated weaknesses. This is one research direction of this work.
Moreover, in the future, we could evaluate our catalog with security experts, looking
forward to expand the catalog. Also, we can conduct experiments to verify how effective
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